By Cambridge Unviersity Press
FEW of the new nations of Africa lack, as part of their colonial heritage, their potential Biafras-hence the reluctance of most African states to recognise the secessionist Eastern Region of Nigeria. This article is concerned with one of them, the Barotse Province of Zambia, and attempts to illuminate the historical background of the situation, the motives of the Lozi ruling class in demanding secession, and the methods by which successive colonial and independent governments have met
this challenge.
ORIGINS OF THE DEMAND FOR SECESSION
The Lozi reached the upper Zambesi River, probably from the Congo basin, during the late seventeenth century. From this base they con-quered outwards, until their empire encompassed some 25 other peoples, extending from Southern Rhodesia to the Congo and from Angola to the Kafue River. Although there has been considerable assimilation by 'pure Lozi' of members of their vassal tribes, those who lived in the
flood-plain of the Zambesi-in Bulozi or Barotseland proper-have nevertheless always considered themselves a distinct and superior breed, a chosen people. This concept, a function partly of Lozi hegemony over this vast empire for nearly two centuries, was sanctified during the colonial era by the special status which, as we shall see, the Lozi ruling class was granted.
In 1880 the great Lozi King Lewanika ( 878-84, 1885-I 9 6), seeking protection against both internal enemies and the Ndebele from the south, signed the Lochner concession, putting his country under the 'pro- tection' of the British South Africa Company.1 Although the concession was to be 'considered in the light of a treaty between my said Barotse nation' and the British Government,2 Barotseland was soon regarded by
* Assistant Professor of History, The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto.
1 See my forthcoming article, 'Barotseland's Scramble for Protection', in The Journal of AfricanHistory (Cambridge).
2 Reproduced in T. W. Baxter, 'The Concessions of Northern Rhodesia', in National ArchivesofRhodesiaandNyasaland,OccasionaPlapers(Salisbury),JuneI963,p.8.
L. CAPLAN*
23-2BAROTSELAND
Kasempa
BAROTSELAND: SECESSIONIST CHALLENGE TO ZAMBIA
345 the administration as merely another unit, albeit a specially privileged
one, of the larger territory of Northern Rhodesia. Moreover, as Eric Stokes has shown, by i914 Lewanika 'had lost whatever governing powers he had possessed...outside Barotseland proper, and even within his reserved territory he had no more than a limited subordinate jurisdiction'.l While the King's formal status was lofty, his real power was only moderately greater than that of other chiefs in Northern Rhodesia. The first half of the reign of Lewanika's son and successor, Yeta III (I916-45), witnessed a bitter struggle by the Lozi ruling class to retrieve some of the rights which Lewanika had been forced to surrender in return for retaining his throne. Neither the Company nor the Colonial Office, which assumed jurisdiction of Northern Rhodesia in 1924, would, however, yield to the Lozi demands.
By the end of the 1920S the Lozi aristocracy grasped that its aspirations would remain unfulfilled, and decided instead that it would have to be satisfied with material manifestations of its elevated status; conspic- uous consumption would have to compensate for the absence of real power.2
In seeking this alternative, the Lozi elite was more successful. The new orthodoxy of indirect rule redounded to its tangible benefit. It was true that, beneath the impressive facade of a state in alliance with the British crown, there lay the stark reality of a wholly undeveloped, almost poverty-stricken labour reserve, the major function of which was to supply the manpower needs of Southern Rhodesian farms and South African mines. Yet, thanks largely to government subsidies, the tiny clique at Lealui, the Lozi capital, thrived in considerable comfort. Moreover, it was the policy of the territorial Government fully to support the traditional Lozi ruling class.
As a result, the latter was persuaded that, if it hardly had the authority
of former days, its position was at least demonstrably more satisfactory than that of most other tribal elites in Northern Rhodesia. So long as
its special status within Northern Rhodesia was recognised, Barotseland's
rulers remained co-operative. But, as they informed the Royal Com-
mission of 1938-9, they were unequivocally opposed to any proposal for amalgamating the two Rhodesias so long as white settlers dominated the south.3
1 Eric Stokes, 'Barotseland: the survival of an African state', in E. Stokes and R. Brown (eds.), The ZambesianPast: studiesin CentralAfricanhistory(Manchester, 1966), p. 296.
2 See my unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 'A Political History of Barotseland, 1875-1965' (University of London, I968), chs. 5 and 6.
3 Reportof the Rhodesiaand JVyasaland Royal Commission[Bledisloe Report], Cmd. 5949 (London, I939), pp. I68-9, I75-6, 218 and 235-6.
GERALD L. CAPLAN
346 By the end of World War Two, under Yeta's half-brotherand suc-
cessor,Imwiko(I945-8), thispositionhadnotonlyhardenedbuthad beenchannelledintoademandforapositivealternative:shouldamalga- mation take place, the Lozi would demand to secede from Northern
Rhodesia and to be made a genuinely self-governingprotectoratealong the lines of the High CommissionTerritoriesof southernAfrica, 'such
as Lewanika always wanted'.l This Lozi stance was in no way moderated by the accessionin I948
of Imwiko's half-brotherMwanawina II, who quickly revealed that his strong loyalty to the Crown and Empire was a very different matter
indeed from accepting the whims of the territory'swhite community. As a result, first the Governorof Northern Rhodesia, A. F. B. Rennie,
and then Arthur Creech-Jones, Labour's Secretary of State for the Colonies, appeared in Barotselandto reassurethe Lealui elite that its prerogativeswould remain inviolate should amalgamation be decided
upon.2 Clearly the Government feared alienating the most famous tribe in
central Africa. The Lozi ruling class saw an opportunity to exploit this
fact. It already possessedconsiderablewealth.3Perhapsit could now use
its bargaining position to retrieve some of its former powers as well.
Within months of his accession, Mwanawina had a petition drawn up
setting out the many grievancesof the Lealui clique and demanding the
restorationof earlier prerogativesand privileges. The petition accord-
ingly sought increased authority for the Kuta (National Council), the right to appoint and dismiss all employees of the Barotseland Native
Authorities, full control over the Native Treasury, and the return of large blocs of territorywhich had been unilaterally excised by both the Company and the Colonial Office administrations.4
For its own reasons,the Governmentin fact had little alternativebut to make some concessions: for it was considered critical, in order to influence other chiefs as well as African opinion generally, to win
1 Fox-Pitt, 'Report on Barotse Province', NorthernRhodesiaNative AffairsAnnualReport- hereafter J.R.N.A.A.R. (Lusaka, I947), p. 71; Frank Worthington to Paramount Chief Imwiko, 27 September I947, in National Archives of Zambia, KDE 2/43/I; Minutes of the National Council Meeting, 4 and 5 June I948, in Barotse Province Files, Mongu Boma (here- after Boma Files), Barotse Native Authorities Conference.
2 A. F. B. Glennie, 'Reports', in N.R.N.A.A.R. (I948), pp. 70-I, and (I949), p. 82; also M. E. Berger, who was a missionary in Barotseland for the Protestant Missionary Society,
1934-49, 196I-6. ' See Glennie, 'The Barotse System of Government, in TheJournalof AfricanAdministra-
tion (London), xv, i, January 1952, p. I3; Glennie, 'A Note on the Barotse Province and Some Current Questions', 25 August I952, Boma Files; see also L. H. Gann, A Historyof Jorthern Rhodesia:earlydaysto 1953 (London, 1964), p. 385.
4 Cited in Glennie, 'A Note on the Barotse Province'.
BAROTSELAND: SECESSIONIST CHALLENGE TO ZAMBIA
347
Mwanawina's approvalfor the proposalto federatethe two Rhodesias
and Nyasaland. Predictably, therefore, Governor Rennie soon an- nounced that the jurisdiction of the paramount chief's court was being extended; whileshortlythereaftertheConservativeColonialSecretary, Harry Hopkinson, flew to Lealui to announce his concurrencewith the recentproposalthat the area'sprotectedstatusbe formalisedby making Barotse Province the 'Barotseland protectorate' within the larger pro- tectorate of Northern Rhodesia.2
Notwithstanding these concessions, however, the Lozi ruling class remained openly hostile to any scheme associating Barotseland with
Southern Rhodesia.3 In April 1953 Governor Rennie again flew to Barotseland. He first addressed a public meeting of about 500 people, of whom precisely eight raised their voices in favour of Federation.4He then conferredprivately and at length with Mwanawina and his senior
advisers.According to the then Ngambela (chief councillor), Walubita, Rennie used'wordstocheatus .5The Governorstressedrepeatedlythat,
since the Queen approved of the Federation, opposition to it was tanta- mount to being disloyal to the Crown. Mwanawina later said that he was unable to resist this argument.6 Having received a pledge that Barotseland'srights were to be enshrinedin the federal constitution and that an order in council would formally declare it the 'Barotseland Protectorate',7 the paramount chief and Kuta announced that they would not oppose Federation,8and officersof the central Government promptly began spreading the news of this decision in order to 'give a lead to other more hesitant tribes'.9
In like circumstances,the Kabaka of Buganda had refused to accept any prospectivefederation of the East African territorieson the ground that he was protecting African interests against European intruders. For his stand, he was temporarily deposed and deported. He thereby greatly increased his public popularity and, as a direct consequence,
1 Glennie, 'Report', in N.R.N.A.A.R. (1952), p. 86.
2 Hopkinson's speech of 5 August 1952, reported in Northern Rhodesian Information Department Press Communique no. 626.
3 Record of Meeting between Secretary of State and Chief and Council, 2 August 1952, in
Boma Files, Proposals for Closer Association between Central African Territories Dossier.
4 Rev. J. P. Burger to Director, 29 April 1953, in Paris Missionary Society Sefula Archives. 5 Interview with Mr Walubita. 6 The version of this story given by Mwanawina to Harry Franklin, UnholyWedlock:the
failure of theCentralAfricanFederation(London, I963), p. 220, is identical almost to the word with that given me by Walubita many years later.
7 Copy of Rennie's address to the Legislative Council, I6 April 1953, in Boma Files, Closer Association Dossier.
8 Cited in notice from Glennie to all Barotse Province District Commissioners, 20 April
1933; ibid. 9 Glennie's 'Report', in JN.R.N.A.A.R. (I953), pp. 93-4.
348
GERALD L. CAPLAN
his authority, a factor significantly affecting the position of Buganda in
pre-independent Uganda and, briefly, independent Uganda.1 Because Mwanawina's decision ran counter to the apparent interests
and declared wishes of his people, he effectively isolated himself from all his subjects save the tiny clique which constituted the ruling class. During the nationalist struggle of the early 196os, he was shown to be
highly unpopular with the large majority of his people, thus rendering it virtually impossible for the British Government to uphold his interests
against those of the African nationalists. The responsibility for this rested wholly with him and his advisers. For they too remained sus- picious of the white leaders of the new Federation, yet at no time did they attempt to reach an accommodation with their natural allies.
This was a tactical area of the greatest consequence. For, even after
1953, Mwanawina might have salvaged something of his personal stand- ing. Had he made concessions to his moderate, elitist, internal opponents
during the remainder of the decade, they might not have aligned them- selves with the nationalists against him. Had he later agreed to co-
operate with the latter, he might have won for himself a position in
Zambia comparable to that temporarily achieved by the Kabaka in
independent Uganda. But his unyielding intransigence assured the ulti- mate destruction of the remaining rump of a formerly powerful empire. The Lealui aristocracy continued throughout the decade to oppose
Roy Welensky's demands for a fully self-governing Federation;2 but the Federal Government perceived that in fact it had in Mwanawina a po- tential ally against the forces of African nationalism. In May 1958 Welensky paid a formal visit to Barotseland, where he guaranteed the paramount chief and Kuta against any interference in their affairs by his Government.3 Many Lozi resented any dealings with Welensky,4 but Mwanawina was prepared to disregard their protests in the know- ledge that his position was solidly supported by the white officials of the territorial Government.5 Conclusive public evidence of the esteem in which the traditional Lozi rulers were held came at the beginning of
1 D. A. Low and R. C. Pratt, Bugandaand British Overrule(London,9Ig6o), app. I; and A. I. Richards, 'Epilogue', in L. A. Fallers, The King's Men (London, I964), pp. 359-64.
2 NorthernNews (Lusaka), 18 November 957; and Gervase Clay,'Report', in N.R.N.A.A.R.
(1958), p. 80. 3 NorthernNews, 20 May 1958. 4 According to Lifunana Imasiku, who later became personal secretary to the paramount
chief and whose father was Ngambela from 1956 to I962. 5 See, for example, Clay, 'Report', in N.R.N.A.A.R. (I958), pp. 79-80; and M. G. Billing
of the Lusaka secretariat, 'Government Policy in the Utilisation of Indigenous Political Systems', in Raymond Apthorpe (ed.), FromTribalRuleto ModernGovernmen(tLusaka, 1959), pp. I-3 and iI.
BAROTSELAND: SECESSIONIST CHALLENGE TO ZAMBIA
349
I959, when the Queen's New Year Honours List included the para- mount chief, who now became Sir Mwanawina Lewanika III, K.B.E.- the first and last African in Central Africa so to be honoured.1
Mwanawina thus appeared to be at the pinnacle of his career. Indeed,
he enjoyed more prestige and privileges than any of his predecessors since the first Company Administrator arrived in Barotseland in I897.
His conservative and isolationist policies had made him indisputably the most important chief in the Federation. Honoured by the Queen, flattered by government officials, wooed by the Prime Minister of the Federation personally, his position seemed as impregnable as that of the Federation itself.
Above all, Mwanawina and Welensky shared the conviction that African nationalism represented the greatest threat to their respective positions. The British Government appeared to the Lozi ruling class more likely to uphold its special status than did Kenneth Kaunda's
militant United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.). Accordingly, all political parties were barred from operating in Lealui, and U.N.I.P. was refused permission to hold meetings therein.2
Mwanawina was not yet prepared, however, to join with white racialists against black nationalists. Apparently at the urging of Godwin
Mbikusita, the self-proclaimed son of King Lewanika who had in 1959 become a member of the Federal Assembly supporting Welensky, the paramount chief renewed his demands for secession.3 When news of this move leaked out, a tremendous uproar ensued. U.N.I.P. leaders agreed with the interpretation of the NorthernNews, a newspaper which sup- ported Welensky, that the decision revealed the Lozi rulers to be as hostile to African nationalism as to white domination.4
The Ngambela, Akabeswa Imasiku, hotly denied that secession was a
reaction to the increasing likelihood of a nationalist victory. Such a
contingency, he asserted, was quite irrelevant, since 'We do not consider ourselves a part of Northern Rhodesia or as a protectorate within a pro- tectorate. We are a different country and a different people. We have our own Government.'5 As a statement of fact, this declaration was entirely accurate. So far as Lealui was concerned, Barotseland's attach- ment to Northern Rhodesia was merely fortuitous, an administrative device which, as has been noted, had been originally initiated by the British South African Company for its own convenience. Barotseland
1 Richard Hall, Zambia(London, 1965), p. 238. 2 Under Order no. 8, Public Meetings, in BarotseNativeGovernmenOtrdersandRules(Lusaka,
1957), p. I, English version.
3 Hall, op. cit. p. and G. AnnualReporton the BarotselandProtectorate 4 240; Clay, (I960).
NorthernJNews,3 December I960. 5 Ibid. 2 December I960.
. CAPLAN
350 had existed as an independent national entity long before the creation
of Northern Rhodesia, and was legally and historicallyentitled to main- tain or to dissolve the attachment as its rulers wished.
In termsof political reality, however, historicalrightswere beside the
point. Eventhe NortherNnews,hostilebut almostreconciledto blackrule
in the future, recognised this truth. It cogently pointed out the funda-
mental weakness of the Lozi position: the demand for Barotseland's
independence if there were an African government could, it foresaw, 'develop into a full scale secession conflict on the lines of Buganda or
Katanga. Poor,primitiveand isolated,the "protectoratewithin a pro- tectorate" scarcely occupies the same key position as these two seces-
sionist provinces do in Uganda and the Congo.'l Moreover, as the newspaper went on to acknowledge, Barotseland
represented 'a remnant of old-style tribal rule which offends modern pan-Africanthinking'. Above all, Lealui'sstandwasintolerableto those U.N.I.P. leaderswhowereLozi-not least,perhaps,becauseanumber of them, particularly Arthur and Sikota Wina, were themselves Lozi
aristocratswith profound personal grievances against the paramount chief. On the initiative of these men, the BarotseAnti-SecessionMove-
ment (B.A.S.M.O.) was formed in Lusaka late in Ig6o;2 their leaders spoke for the majority of Lozi in the towns along the line of rail, who
appeared to be antagonistic to the Lealui clique.3 They warned the Governmentthat, if Barotselandwere allowed to secede, the 'chaos and
discord' which would ensue would be 'much worse' than that which had followed Katanga's secessionfrom the Congo.4
Undeterred by such threats, the paramount chief and the Ngambela flew to London for special talks with Iain MacLeod, the Colonial Secretary, who informed them that secessionwould not serve the best interests of Barotseland. Clearly the British Government was not pre- pared so to appease the Lozi that it would risk facing the wrath of the nationalists.MacLeod did, however, reconfirmyet again Britain'scom- mitments to uphold the integrity of Barotseland and its traditional rulers, and further announced that, in order to elevate him above his peers,the Lozi paramountchiefwould henceforthbe distinguishedwith the supreme title of the Lozi themselves-the Litunga(earth, owner of the land) of the BarotselandProtectorate.5
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